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Priordecision on statutory construction applied retroactively
A judicial decision typically establishes the law governing
causes of action that accrue before and after the decision is ren120
dered, thereby operating both retrospectively and prospectively.
Some courts, however, have engaged in "retroactivity analysis" to
determine whether a denial of retrospective effect is warranted.' 12
At times, they have declined to give retroactive effect to their rulings, especially where the edict overturns long-standing precedent.1 22 This "prospective overruling,"'1 23 it has been asserted,
120 Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 483, 425 N.E.2d 851, 853, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466
(1981); see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-26 (1965); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 788 (2d Cir. 1980); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d
1118, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Incorporated Village of Northport v. Guardian Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 344, 348-49, 384 N.Y.S.2d 923, 927 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), af'd,
54 App. Div. 2d 893, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (2d Dep't 1976). Generally, a case is decided upon
the law existing at the time of its adjudication, rather than upon the law which prevailed at
the time of the occurrence being litigated. People v. Beckford, 102 Misc. 2d 963, 966, 427
N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1980); see, e.g., People v. Bell, 50 N.Y.2d 869,
871, 407 N.E.2d 1340, 1341, 430 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1980); People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288,
296, 347 N.E.2d 898, 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); People v.
Baker, 26 N.Y.2d 169, 172, 257 N.E.2d 630, 632, 309 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (1970); People v.
Donaldson, 25 N.Y.2d 38, 43, 250 N.E.2d 46, 49, 302 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (1969); People v.
Albro, 73 App. Div. 2d 73, 75-76, 425 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (3d Dep't 1980); Garlock v. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 1006, 1006, 386 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (4th Dep't
1976).
2I See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-40 (1965). Seminal in the area of
retroactivity is the Supreme Court decision of Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287
U.S. 358 (1932). In that case, the Court held that a Montana court, in refusing to apply a
decision retroactively, did not infringe upon fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 361-62.
The Court stated that it was constitutionally permissible for a state to delineate the extent
to which it would adhere to precedent that had been declared no longer valid. Id. at 364.
See generally Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
1 (1960). Indeed, subsequent cases expanded the application of the nonretroactivity doctrine. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965) (limiting retroactive effect
of prior decision involving constitutional rights); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940) (extending retroactivity analysis to a decision declaring
a statute unconstitutional).
122 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971); Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475,
483-84, 425 N.E.2d 851, 854, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1981); Incorporated Village of
Northport v. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 344, 349, 384 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), aff'd, 54 App. Div. 2d 893, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (2d Dep't 1976).
New York courts have long recognized that a decision may be stripped of its retroactive
effect. In Harris v. Jex, 55 N.Y. 421 (1874), for instance, the defendant paid two mortgages
in legal tender notes. Id. at 422. Prior to the time of payment, however, a Supreme Court
decision had indicated that the payee in such a transaction was entitled to receive payment
in gold. Id. at 423. Although that decision was overruled prior to the trial in Harris,the
Court of Appeals nevertheless stated that "[t]he plaintiff had a right to repose upon the
decision of the highest judicial tribunal in the land," id. at 424, and refused to apply retro-
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tends to protect justifiable reliance upon established principles of
law. 2 4 Recently, in Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.,' 25 the
actively the overruling decision. Id. at 425.
123

A court prospectively overrules when it enunciates a new rule of law to be followed

only in future cases, thereby eliminating the decision's retroactive effect. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Effect Only: "Prospective Overruling" or
"Sunbursting," 51 MARQ. L. REV. 254, 254 (1968); see 55 WASH. L. REV. 833, 837 n.26 (1980).
The technique is also called "sunbursting" after the Supreme Court decision endorsing its
validity in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). Fairchild,
supra, at 255.
124 Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 644 (1967) ("reliance upon the earlier decision ... is the fundamental
justification for a prospective overruling"); see Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A
Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1560 (1975); Note, Prospective-Prospective
Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 82 (1966); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive
Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 912 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Retroactive Application]. Reliance frequently is considered by the courts as a crucial factor
in the retroactivity analysis. See, e.g., Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 483-84, 425 N.E.2d
851, 854, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1981); People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262, 270, 333 N.E.2d
339, 344-45, 372 N.Y.S.2d 25, 32-33 (1975). In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1968), for example, the Third Circuit, recognizing the potential
"evils of retroactivity," stated: "[W]e think it erroneous to award damages for conduct manifestly pursued in the shelter of Supreme Court approval, at least until such time as subsequent decisions have clearly announced a change in the applicable law." Id. at 788-89; see
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 75, 246
N.E.2d 725, 731, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 963-64 (1969); Incorporated Village of Northport v.
Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 344, 349, 384 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County), aff'd, 54 App. Div. 2d 893, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (2d Dep't 1976); 55 WASH. L.
REV., supra note 123, at 836 ("the primary mischief of the retroactive effect of overruling
decisions has been its perceived tendency to frustrate reasonable reliance on precedent"). In
addition to reliance, courts have examined other factors in their decisions to apply prospectively new rules of law. One such factor is whether the underlying purpose of the newly
enunciated doctrine would be furthered by solely prospective application. See Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 251-52
(1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965); People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262,
269, 333 N.E.2d 339, 344, 372 N.Y.S.2d 25, 32 (1975); People v. Graham, 76 App. Div. 2d
228, 230, 431 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (3d Dep't 1980); People v. Albro, 73 App. Div. 2d 73, 75, 425
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (3d Dep't 1980); People v. Wise, 104 Misc. 2d 77, 79-80, 427 N.Y.S.2d
691, 692-93 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980), aff'd, 82 App. Div. 2d 869, 440 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d
Dep't 1981). Other considerations that courts focus upon are the equitable consequences of
retroactive application, see Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 107; Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1177 (2d Cir. 1977); Childs v. Childs, 69 App. Div. 2d
406, 420, 419 N.Y.S.2d 533, 542 (2d Dep't 1979); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 88 Misc. 2d 1047, 1050, 391 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977); In
re Martz, 102 Misc. 2d 102, 122, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378, 391 (Family Ct. Ulster County 1979); and
the practical results of retroactivity upon the orderly administration of the law, see, e.g., In
re D, 27 N.Y.2d 90, 96, 261 N.E.2d 627, 631, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 709 (1970) ("retroactive
application ... would substantially affect countless juvenile delinquency adjudications
made on the prior standard"); People v. Colebut, 86 Misc. 2d 729, 737, 383 N.Y.S.2d 985,
991 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) (retroactivity "would work a major dislocation in the ad-
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New York Court of Appeals, despite applying retroactivity analyof statutory interpresis,"' held that a prior decision on a question
127
tation should be applied retrospectively.
In Gurnee, two actions involving identical issues were consolidated on appeal.1 28 Both plaintiffs were injured in automobile accidents, and each thereafter lost wages in excess of $1,000 per
month.1 29 In accordance with New York State Insurance Department regulations then in effect interpreting section 671 of the Insurance Law, 30 each plaintiff's insurance carrier paid $800 per
month as first-party benefits, the maximum amount payable for
lost wages.' 31 The Court of Appeals subsequently decided Kurcsics
v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co.,' 3 2 which rejected the Superintendent of Insurance's interpretation of the applicable no-fault
law and established that an injured plaintiff is entitled to a maximum of $1000 per month for lost earnings. 133 The plaintiffs thereministration of justice"). Finally, it should be noted that constitutional issues may override
any other factors and mandate either retroactive or nonretroactive application. See, e.g.,
Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 484, 425 N.E.2d 851, 854, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1981); In re
"S", 63 Misc. 2d 253, 257, 311 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931-32 (Family Ct. Kings County 1970)
("[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is fundamental to due process and . . . goes to the
integrity of the fact-finding process and the fairness of the trial. It must therefore be
granted retroactivity as a constitutional principle") (emphasis in original).
12555 N.Y.2d 184, 433 N.E.2d 128, 448 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1982).
128 Id. at 191-94, 433 N.E.2d at 130-31, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48.
127 Id. at 190, 433 N.E.2d at 129, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
"I Id. at 184, 433 N.E.2d at 128, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
'22 Id. at 190-91, 433 N.E.2d at 129, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 146. Morris Gurnee, one of the
plaintiffs, was injured in November 1977, in an accident involving a car insured by Aetna
Life & Casualty Company. Id. at 190, 433 N.E.2d at 129, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 146. He claimed
that, as a result of his injuries, he lost wages in excess of $3,200 per month. Id. Moshe
Weinreich was injured in July 1975, in an accident involving an automobile insured by
State-Wide Insurance Company, and, he, like Gurnee, claimed lost wages of at least $1,000
per month. Id. at 191, 433 N.E.2d at 129, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
130 [1982] 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.6(n)(2)(xi). Section 671(1)(b) of the Insurance Law provides that "basic economic loss" includes "loss of earnings from work which the injured
person would have performed had he not been injured ... up to one thousand dollars per
month." N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982). The section further states that
"first party benefits" do not include "twenty percent of lost earnings pursuant to paragraph
(b) of subdivision one." Id. § 671(2)(a). The Superintendent of Insurance interpreted section
671 to mean that the $1,000 monthly limitation should be reduced by the 20-percent offset,
thereby resulting in a maximum payable first-party benefit of $800 per month. [1982] 11
N.Y.C.R.R. § 65.6(n)(2)(xi).
231 55 N.Y.2d at 190-91, 433 N.E.2d at 129, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
132 49 N.Y.2d 451, 403 N.E.2d 159, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1980).
132 Id. at 458-59, 403 N.E.2d at 163, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 458. The Court in Kurcsics ruled
that a covered person is entitled to 80 percent of actual lost earnings, up to a maximum
recovery of $1,000 per month, id. at 458, 403 N.E.2d at 163, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 457-58, reason-
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upon brought suit against their respective insurance carriers to recover the difference between the two maximum amounts. 3 4 Special
term granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action, ruling that Kurcsics should not be applied retroactively. 13 5 The Appellate Division, First and Fourth Departments,
affirmed in each case.1 8
The Court of Appeals reversed, 137 holding that there was "no
persuasive reason" to prohibit retroactive application of the Kurcsics decision.3' Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Judge Cooke
initially questioned the applicability of retroactivity analysis to a
decision of first impression interpreting statutory language, since
such analysis typically was restricted to cases overruling prior decisional mandates. 3 9 The Court, however, found it unnecessary to
resolve this question, as it determined that "traditional" retroactivity analysis nevertheless would dictate that Kurcsics apply retroactively to the plaintiffs' petitions. 4 0 Balancing the three factors
that the Supreme Court has determined are relevant to the retroactivity inquiry,' 4 1 the Court first observed that Kurcsics involved
ing that the legislature did not intend to limit recovery to $800, id. A dissenting opinion
urged that "a plain reading" of the statute compelled a contrary result. Id. at 460, 403
N.E.2d at 164, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
134 55 N.Y.2d at 190-91, 433 N.E.2d at 129, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
"5 Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 104 Misc. 2d 840, 845, 428 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1980). Applying the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, see infra note 141 and accompanying text, the Gurnee Court initially noted
that the Kurcsics panel had referred to the litigation as "a question of first impression." 104
Misc. 2d at 842-43, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 994; see Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d
451, 454, 403 N.E.2d 159, 160, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (1980). It further noted that since the
purpose of the legislation was to ensure victim compensation, retroactivity was contraindicated to avoid the possible insolvency of insurers and the consequent loss of future benefits
that might result from insurers being held for retroactive payments. 104 Misc. 2d at 843, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 994. Moreover, retroactive application, the court concluded, would entail "substantial inequitable results." Id. at 844, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
136 Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 79 App. Div. 2d 860, 437 N.Y.S.2d 944 (4th
Dep't 1980) (unanimous decision); Weinreich v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 80 App. Div. 2d 756,
437 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1st Dep't 1981).
137 55 N.Y.2d at 195, 433 N.E.2d at 132, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
138 Id. at 194, 433 N.E.2d at 131, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
13. Id. at 191, 433 N.E.2d at 130, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 147. The Court noted that retroactivity analysis generally had been utilized "where there has been an abrupt shift in controlling
decisional law." Id.
140

Id.

141

Id. at 192-93, 433 N.E.2d at 130-31, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48; see Chevron Oil Co. v.

Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). In Chevron, the Supreme Court delineated the three
factors of retroactivity analysis as follows:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of
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merely the construction of statutory language rather than the establishment of a new principle of law. 142 Additionally, stated the
Chief Judge, the legislative intent of ensuring swift and full compensation for motor vehicle accident victims would be better
served by giving retroactive effect to the Kurcsics ruling. 143 Finally,
the Court concluded that because no-fault insurance requires
plaintiffs to relinquish their right to sue for pain and suffering incurred in minor injuries, it would be manifestly inequitable to
deny them their statutory quid pro quo by permitting
only a par44
tial recovery for their covered economic loss.
The Court of Appeals decision in Gurnee represents New
York's first significant encounter with the standards of retroactivity analysis previously enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court. 45 Other courts, particularly the federal courts of appeals,
law, either by overruling clear past precedent... or by deciding an issue of first
impression ....

Second, .

.

. [the court must look] "to the prior history of the

rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
further or retard its operation." Finally,. . . [the court should take into account]
any inequity imposed by retroactive application.
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 629) (citations
omitted).
42 55 N.Y.2d at 192, 433 N.E.2d at 130, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 147. Chevron dictates that a
decision either must overrule settled precedent or resolve an issue of first impression "whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
The Gurnee Court acknowledged that the Superintendent of Insurance had promulgated a
contrary regulation prior to Kurcsics, 55 N.Y.2d at 192, 433 N.E.2d at 130, 448 N.Y.S.2d at
147, but evidently did not view this as establishing "clear past precedent," see id.; Chevron,
404 U.S. at 106. Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that Kurcsics had presented a
novel issue whose resolution was not clearly predictable, 55 N.Y.2d at 192, 433 N.E.2d at
130, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 147, noting that the language of section 671 suggested the result
reached in Kurcsics, id.
55 N.Y.2d at 192-93, 433 N.E.2d at 130-31, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48. The Court recognized that retroactive application of Kurcsics would conflict with the legislative intent behind no-fault insurance, namely, to ease insurance coverage costs and court congestion
stemming from the proliferation of vehicular accident suits. Id. at 192, 433 N.E.2d at 130,
448 N.Y.S.2d at 147. The Court reasoned, however, that the overriding goal of the legislation
was to ensure "full" compensation for accident victims. Id. (emphasis in original). Hence,
Chief Judge Cooke ruled, the purpose of the legislation would be better served by retroactivity. Id. at 193, 433 N.E.2d at 131, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
Id. The Court "[s]wep[t] aside the insurers' arguments that [retroactive] imposition
of the $1,000 per month limit would create severe financial hardships for carriers whose
premium rates were based upon a potential liability of only $800," Shayne & Dachs, "Kurcsics'" Final Chapter,N.Y.L.J., March 9, 1982, at 1, col. 1, reasoning that the unfairness to
the injured parties far outweighed any financial difficulties imposed upon the defendants, 55
N.Y.2d at 193, 433 N.E.2d at 131, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 148. Moreover, the Court observed, the
statute of limitations already had relieved a portion of the insurer's liability. Id.
It appears that no substantial examination of the Chevron standards had been undertaken prior to Gurnee at other than the trial court level. In one case, Incorporated Vil143

144

245

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:178

have treated the first factor, whether the decision in question alters established legal principles, as a threshold inquiry which, 4if
not satisfied, automatically mandates retroactive application., 6
New York, however, apparently has joined the ranks of other jurisdictions that tend to apply the test in a factor-balancing manner. 4 7 It is submitted that this is the preferable approach insofar
lage of Northport v. Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Misc. 2d 344, 384 N.Y.S.2d 923
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), af'd, 54 App. Div. 2d 893, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (2d Dep't 1976),
the court held that retrospective application of a prior decision was not warranted, citing
various policy and equity considerations. 87 Misc. 2d at 350, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court
noted that the issue was one "of first impression 'whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."' Id. (quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106). In Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 88 Misc. 2d 1047, 391 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977), the court read
Chevron as suggesting a "flexible treatment" of retroactivity analysis. Id. at 1050, 391
N.Y.S.2d at 971. Further, in Kroul v. Kroul, 99 Misc. 2d 1031, 417 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1979), the court indicated that should a statute be held unconstitutional,
"pragmatic" factors would dictate that it apply prospectively only, citing Chevron in support of its determination. Id. at 1032, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 848. Finally, the appellate division in
Childs v. Childs, 69 App. Div. 2d 406, 419 N.Y.S.2d 533 (2d Dep't 1979), cursorily addressed
the Chevron standards in denying retroactive effect to a United States Supreme Court decision, ruling simply that "[the decision] overruled clear past precedent relied upon ceaselessly and that retroactive application ... would produce chaotic, inequitable results." Id.
at 420, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
14'Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980) ("unless the first
factor is satisfied there is no occasion to consider the other two"); United States v. Bowen,
500 F.2d 960, 975 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[tlhe first step in deciding whether a case is to have
retroactive effect is to apply a threshold test to determine whether the decision establishes a
new rule"), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 996 (7th Cir. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969) (retrospectivity analysis appropriate where decision
represented a "clear break with the past"); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481, 499 (1968) (decision not constituting "avulsive change which caused the current of the law thereafter to flow between new banks" applied retroactively); Ferguson v.
United States, 513 F.2d 1011, 1012-13 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[r]etroactivity analysis is appropriate
for cases departing radically from precedent .... But it is irrelevant to that application of
well-established principles to varying fact situations whch represents the bulk of judicial
decision-making"). Justice Stewart, who authored the Chevron decision, made it clear in
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), that the first factor was intended as a threshold
inquiry, by stating that "[an issue of the 'retroactivity' of a decision . . .isnot even
presented unless the decision in question marks a sharp break in the web of the law." Id. at
381 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Several state courts also have adhered to this view. See,
e.g., Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 701, 344 A.2d 80, 98 (1975); Schreiber v. Republic Intermodal Corp., 473 Pa. 614, 622, 375 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1977). In Crabtree v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 89 IlM. App. 3d 35, 411 N.E.2d 19 (App. Ct. 1980), the court clearly indicated
that a decision that did not establish a new rule of law would be applied retroactively. Id. at
42, 411 N.E.2d at 24; see Mertes v. Lincoln Park Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 34 Ill. App. 3d
557, 559-61, 340 N.E.2d 25, 26-27 (App. Ct. 1975).
147 The Gurnee Court ruled that retroactive application was mandated by consideration
of "all the applicable criteria." 55 N.Y.2d at 194, 433 N.E.2d at 131, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
Other courts have exhibited a similar inclination to weigh the three Chevron factors equally.
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as the tripartite evaluation better assures that reliance interests
will be protected, the primary purpose underlying retroactivity
analysis. 148 Indeed, given a decision that usurps substantial justified reliance upon established rules, but nonetheless fails to constitute a significant upheaval in the law, the federal paradigm seemingly would require retrospectivity, 149 while under the Court's
approach the likelihood of solely prospective operation would still
exist. 150
It is suggested further that the less restrictive approach taken
by the Gurnee Court is appealing from a theoretical as well as a
policy standpoint. Underlying the retroactive application of law
has been the traditional notion that an overruling court simply
enunciates the law as it has always existed.1 51 By making retroSee, e.g., Alexander v. Orford School Dist., 117 N.H. 641, 644-46, 377 A.2d 127, 130-31
(1977); Bradbury v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 19 Wash. App. 66, 68-70, 573 P.2d 395, 39697 (Ct. App. 1978); Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 N.W.2d 757, 761
(1979). Some courts have rejected the threshold test favored by the federal bar. See, e.g.,
State v. Carpentieri, 82 N.J. 546, 550-51, 414 A.2d 966, 968 (1980) (decision need not constitute sharp break in the law to be denied retroactive effect, at least in the area of the application of the exclusionary rule); Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363, 369-70 (N.D. 1975)
(whether decision was foreshadowed is not dispositive but "[r]ather, these factors must be
weighed with the other considerations bearing on the issue"); Taskett v. King Broadcasting
Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 455-56, 546 P.2d 81, 91 (1976) (the majority "has ignored Chevron's
use of the 'New principle of law'. . . criterion, which is the main factor used in civil cases")
(Stafford, C.J., dissenting in part, and concurring in part); see Bershefsky v. Commonwealth, 491 Pa. 102, 111-12, 418 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1980) (Nix, J., dissenting).
145 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. In Gurnee, the Court afforded Kurcsics
retroactive effect, evidently feeling that the insurers' reliance upon the administrative ruling
was outweighed by other equitable considerations. 55 N.Y.2d at 193, 433 N.E.2d at 131, 448
N.Y.S.2d at 148. It is submitted that the significance of the Court's decision, however, lies in
its approach to the Chevron standards, rather than in its factual consideration. See infra
notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
"" See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150 It is suggested that if the first factor is not viewed as a threshold inquiry, decisions
not constituting radical departures from prior law nonetheless may be examined with respect to policy and equity considerations, thereby leaving open the possibility of solely prospective operation. Indeed, at least one court has stated that "[a]ny broader reading of
Chevron [i.e., other than as a threshold test] would require courts to engage in the balancing
process demanded by the second and third factors whenever a recognized legal principle
- . . had been applied-or not applied-to a situation not precisely covered by previous
decisions." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980). Hence, construing the test as a three-factor balancing one expands its potential application. See id.
151 The common-law theory underlying the retrospective application of judicial decisions is that the superseding ruling does not change the law, but rather, correctly states it,
thereby making the prior incorrect exposition void ab initio. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMrNTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 70 (London 1765). A Blackstone has stated:
But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law,
but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the
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spectivity more difficult to achieve, however, the Court's approach
to retroactivity analysis reflects the contemporary awareness that
courts in fact do create new law152 and that affected reliance interests should be protected.1 5 Indeed, the Court of Appeals in
Gurnee appears to have adopted an approach to retrospectivity
analysis which is both consonant with the underlying policy rationale of retrospectivity and consistent with modern jurisprudential
reality.
David L. Mogel

former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established
custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.
Id. (emphasis in original). This doctrine, commonly known as Blackstonian retroactivity or
declaratory theory, see Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 (1977), posits
that an overruling court simply declares "what the law has always been." Id.; see People v.
Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262, 267-68, 333 N.E.2d 339, 342-43, 372 N.Y.S.2d 25, 30 (1975); Note,
Retroactive Application, supra note 124, at 907-08. Hence, a decision establishing new law
is accorded retroactive effect unless the cause of action to which it is to be applied is barred
by a statute of limitations, an accord and satisfaction, or res judicata. Fairchild, supra note
123, at 254.
12 As early as 1869, the theory of retroactive case application underwent criticism.
John Austin, for example, derided "the childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody,
existing . . . from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges." 2 J.
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 655 (London 1869) (emphasis in original). A more contemporary critic, Justice Traynor, referred to the notion that the law "had been there all
along in the bushes" as a fable. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of
JudicialResponsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535 (1977). Indeed, the basic assumption of
declaratory theory-the existence of a body of predetermined, immutable law-has little to
recommend itself. Munzer, supra note 151, at 375; see DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
520 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1975). The modern trend is to recognize that the judiciary does, in
fact, create new law. As one commentator has stated, "the creative theory of law must be
regarded as the most widely accepted view of the judicial process." E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 439 (1974). Additionally, the practice of prospective overruling, whereby courts
decline to give retroactive effect to their rulings, see supra note 123, is itself a recognition of
the fact that the courts create new law. Mishkin, Foreward: The High Court, the Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 58 (1965) see Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-25 (1965).
'53 See supra note 124 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 148.

